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No ADEQUATE RECOMPENSE FOR DESTRUCTION:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW YORK MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS APPLIED TO
MISDIAGNOSIS OF LATENT DISEASE
Lillian M. Spiess*
This Article focuses on the language and purpose of Article ,
Section 16 of the New York State Constitution's Bill of Rights ("Sec-
tion 16") and its applicability to New York's statute of limitations for
medical malpractice ("New York statute'), which seemingly results
in an unconstitutional bar to such actions in the context of the misdi-
agnosis of latent disease. The New York statute forecloses an action
beyond two-and-one-half years after injury, except in cases of mis-
placed foreign objects and continuous treatment. In the case of latent
disease, the statute may bar any action before the victim knows, or
has reason to know, an injury occurred. Under Section 16, no exist-
ing right of action to recover damages for wrongful death will be ab-
rogated and the amount recoverable will not be subject to any statu-
tory limitation, thereby setting the stage for a challenge to the New
York statute on state constitutional grounds.
This Article begins with a discussion of dual federalism, then
traces the historical and theoretical development of Section 16, its
enactment, and its leading judicial interpretations and challenges.
Finally, this Article discusses. how Section 16 can be used as a basis
for striking down the New York statute.
The implications of a successful challenge to the New York
statute are considerable, as it would provide a constitutional solution
for the medical malpractice victim 'sfamily members and survivors to
finally have their day in court.
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Hofstra Law School; B.A., St. John's University;
M.A., St. John's University; J.D., Touro Law Center; LL.M. New York University.
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No ADEQUATE RECOMPENSE FOR DESTRUCTION:
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW YORK MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS APPLIED TO
MISDIAGNOSIS OF LATENT DISEASE
"The right of action now existing to recover damages for inju-
ries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated; and the amount re-
coverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation."1
"[H]uman life cannot be replaced, and therefore there can be
no adequate recompense made for its destruction ....
INTRODUCTION
This Article focuses on the language and purpose of Article I,
Section 16 of the New York State Constitution's Bill of Rights and its
applicability to N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-a ("Rule 214-a"), which results in
an unconstitutional bar to actions in the context of the misdiagnosis
of latent disease.3
First, this Article begins with a review of dual federalism.4
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 16. Section 16 was initially enacted as section 18 of article I. To
eliminate any confusion , reference to this section will only be as Section 16.
2 3 CHARLES Z. LINCOLN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW YORK 64 (photo. reprint
1994) (1906) (quoting Louis McKinstry, Delegate to New York's Fourth Constitutional
Convention, 1894).
3 See Webster v. Nupuf, 730 N.Y.S.2d 906 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2001); Bonanza v. Raj,
721 N.Y.S.2d 204 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2001).
4 Federalism is
[a] way of organizing a nation so that two levels of government have
formal authority over the same area and people. [Under this system],
each level of government must have some domain in which its policies
are dominant and have some genuine political or constitutional guarantee
of its authority.
3
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Next, this Article discusses the historical and theoretical contexts sur-
rounding the enactment of Section 16, as well as judicial challenges
to, and interpretations of this section. Finally, this Article demon-
strates how Section 16 can be used as the basis for striking down
Rule 214-a.
I. DUAL FEDERALISM
Historically, state constitutions were enacted prior to the Fed-
eral Constitution.5 Therefore, it was initially believed the ratification
of the Bill of Rights into the Federal Constitution was duplicative and
unnecessary, partly because state constitutions already contained
these protections.6
However, when the Bill of Rights was finally ratified, there
was no thought state constitutions were subordinated, or their provi-
sions rendered redundant.7 The idea was that each state would re-
main the primary guarantor of individual liberties, and the "immedi-
ate and visible guardian of life and property" for its citizens.8
ROBERT L. LINEBERRY, GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA: PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND POLICY 664 (2d
ed. 1983).
5 See generally Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge of the State of New York, Dual Consti-
tutionalism in Practice and Principle, Address Before the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of
New York (Feb. 26, 1987), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/history/pdf/Library/Juidges/
DualConstitutionalism.pdf. The New York State Constitution was adopted on April 20,
1777, a full decade prior to the ratification of the Federal Constitution.
6 id.
7 Id.
8 Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 120 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961)).
The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared
with the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor ... they will
generally possess the confidence and good-will of the people, and with
so important a support, will be able effectually to oppose all encroach-
ments of the national government.
170 [Vol. 24
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This theoretical precept was upheld by the Supreme Court in
Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore.9 Barron involved a
suit against the City of Baltimore under the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The city had enacted several ordinances which
diverted streams into the vicinity of Barron's wharf. The streams,
carrying and depositing silt and other debris, made the harbor so shal-
low that Barron's pier became unusable. 10 The Supreme Court dis-
missed the case for lack of jurisdiction and viewed the Fifth Amend-
ment, and inferentially the entire Bill of Rights, as "intended solely as
a limitation on the exercise of power by the government of the United
States, and... not applicable to the legislation of the states."'" Chief
Justice John Marshall, writing for the Court, stated:
Each state established a constitution for itself, and, in
that constitution, provided such limitations and restric-
tions on the powers of its particular government as its
judgment dictated.
... In their several constitutions, [the states] have im-
posed such restrictions on their respective govern-
ments as their own wisdom suggested; such as they
deemed most proper for themselves. It is a subject on
which they judge exclusively .... "
"The state courts ... understood that they were the arbiters of
THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 122 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
9 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
10 Kaye, supra note 5.
11 Barron, 32 U.S. at 250-51.
12 Id. at 247-48.
2008]
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their own constitutions." 13 For example, the New York Court of Ap-
peals, in Wynehamer v. People,14 struck down a statute found to be in
violation of the due process clause of the state constitution.15 The
court noted that it was
not insensible to the delicacy and importance of the
duty [it assumed] in overruling an act of the legisla-
ture, believed by so many intelligent and good men to
afford the best remedy for great and admitted evils in
society; but we cannot forget that the highest function
intrusted to us is that of maintaining inflexibly the
fundamental law. And believing ... that the prohibi-
tory act transcends the constitutional limits of the leg-
islative power, it must be adjudged to be void.
16
Although the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
17
changed the jurisprudential applicability of the Federal Constitution
to the states, state constitutions continue to "function independently
of the [F]ederal Constitution."' 8 This backdrop of dual federalism
shifts the focus of the discussion to the historical and theoretical con-
texts of Section 16.
13 Kaye, supra note 5.
14 13 N.Y. 378 (1856).
15 Wynehamer, 13 N.Y. at 405-06.
16 Id.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states, in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...
18 Kaye, supra note 5. In 1911, the New York Court of Appeals stated that Supreme
Court interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment are simply not "controlling of our con-








The historical context of the theoretical underpinnings of Sec-
tion 16 is paramount to support for the unconstitutionality of Rule
214-a, as it applies to the misdiagnosis of latent disease.
In English jurisprudence, the notion of preserving the right to
a cause of action for wrongful death was codified in 1846. This ef-
fectively abrogated the inflexibility of the common law rule, which
denied such a right. In New York, the guarantee of this protection
was unequivocally championed by the legislature in 1847. However,
the statute was later amended and its underlying purpose compro-
mised. As a result, Section 16 was passed at the New York Constitu-
tional Convention of 1894 because the legislature knew nothing less
than a constitutional amendment would give practical effect to pres-
ervation of this right.
A. Historical and Theoretical Contexts
It has been suggested that a constitution reflects those values
the populace does not wish to risk to the more fleeting and capricious
nature of our political system. James Madison noted these are the
values that "counteract the impulses of interest and passion." 9 The
implementation into the New York Constitution of a guaranteed right
to a cause of action for wrongful death, a protection not guaranteed
by the Federal Constitution, placed that right beyond repeal of the
legislature, only subject to revision by the electorate. From that pro-
19 Kaye, supra note 5 (citing Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17,
1788), reprinted in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 273 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1904)).
2008]
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spective, the origins and enactment of Section 16 are unremarkable.
The history of Section 16 had its beginnings in England. In
1846, the English Parliament abrogated the common law rule denying
a cause of action for wrongful death resulting from negligence, and
enacted a statute which expressly provided for such an action.2°
The act was introduced by Lord Campbell (later known as
"Lord Campbell's Act"), approved by Parliament, and provided:
[W]hensoever the death of a person shall be caused by
the wrongful act, neglect, or default, and the act, ne-
glect, or default is such as would (if death had not en-
sued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an ac-
tion and recover damages in respect thereof, then and
in every such case the person who would have been li-
able if death had not ensued shall be liable to an action
for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person
injured, and although the death shall have been caused
under such circumstances as amount in law to felony.
That every such action shall be for the benefit
of the wife, husband, parent, and child of the person
whose death shall have been caused, and shall be
brought by and in the name of the executor or admin-
istrator of the person deceased, and in every such ac-
tion the jury may give such damages as they think
proportionate to the injury resulting from such death to
the parties respectively for whom and for whose bene-
fit such action shall be brought; and the amount so re-
covered, after deducting the costs not recovered from
the defendant, shall be divided amongst the before-
mentioned parties in such shares as the jury, by their
verdict, shall find and direct. 2'
20 3 LINCOLN, supra note 2, at 58.
21 Id. at 59.
[Vol. 24
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The next year, the New York State Legislature enacted the
English statute practically verbatim, including the provision for
unlimited damages recoverable.22 Opposition to the law was evident
almost immediately. 23 The statute was amended in 1848 to limit re-
covery to $3,000, and subsequently increased to $5,000.24 While
both statutes allowed recovery for the widow and next of kin, the
New York statute initially omitted the widower.2 5 To clarify any ju-
dicial confusion, the New York Legislature amended the statute again
in 1870, authorizing a cause of action for a husband in the event of
his wife's death.26 A decade later, these provisions were included in
Sections 1902-1905 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Furthermore,
these sections were in force in 1894, the year Section 16 was ratified
as part of the state constitution.27
The introduction of the amendment was brought to the Con-
stitutional Convention of 1894 to ensure "no statutory limitation...
be placed upon the amount of damages recoverable by civil action for
the loss of human life. 28 At first, the majority of delegates consider-
ing the amendment believed it was a matter for the legislature.29
22 Id.
23 Id. at 60 ("At the next session ... [of the legislature], the Syracuse & Utica Railroad
Company presented a petition to the assembly for a repeal of the law, and a like memorial
was presented by the Ontario Steam & Canal Company.").
24 Id.




29 Id. at 62 (noting the implementation of a cause of action for wrongful death claims was
not appropriate for a written constitution).
2008]
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However, the majority acknowledged the legislature improperly
placed a cap on the damages for which one could recover.30 Support-
ers of the amendment believed it was imperative to place a limitation
on the legislature to avoid any interference with the jury, which
should be the final arbiter on the award of damages in a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful death.31 The amendment was among a sizable class
of provisions that may have been unnecessary because the legislature
could have adopted statutory provisions in their stead. However, it
was noted:
the people have learned that legislative power is not
always properly exercised, and that it needs restraint
and limitation; therefore, numerous provisions have
been included in all our Constitutions, which are not
strictly the expression of essential principles of gov-
ernment, but are intended to prescribe legislative du-
ties and impose legislative restrictions.32
Additionally, proponents reasoned the amount recoverable
should be circumstantial to each case, thus an arbitrary maximum
was unreasonable. Further, they noted this was the purpose of the
original statute. 3 By placing a $5,000 limitation on the amount re-
coverable, the legislature "reduced the value of all lives, and the in-
fluences, benefits, and relationships dependent on those lives to a uni-
form valuation. 34
30 3 LINCOLN, supra note 2, at 62.
31 Id.
32 id.
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Concern among the delegates also focused on preserving the
right of action created by the statute; language that failed to address
this issue was rejected.35 Finally, the two sides agreed that if the right
of action was not constitutionally protected, there would be no practi-
cal effect given to the prohibition on the amount recoverable. The
amendment was adopted by a vote of 107-40.36 The amendment
states, "[t]he right of action now existing to recover damages for inju-
ries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated; and the amount re-
coverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation.,
37
The ratification of this amendment into the New York Bill of
Rights preserved the inflexibility of the common law, which had been
abrogated by statute. Subsequently, the legislature amended the
Code of Civil Procedure to reflect this guarantee by striking the limi-
tation of damages recoverable for wrongful death.38
35 3 LINCOLN, supra note 2, at 60. For example, one particular amendment, the Tucker
Amendment, stated, "no statutory limitation shall be placed upon the amount of damages
recoverable by civil action for the loss of human life." Id.
36 Id. at 65. In consideration of this amendment, statistics were reported which indicated
5,295 deaths had occurred in the state in 1893 as a result of accidents or violence, but it was
unclear how many would have resulted in a cause of action. Id. at 64. In addition, a report
from the railroad commission noted 742 persons died in railroad accidents, but only thirty of
these persons were passengers on trains, and only ten were killed under circumstances which
may have given rise to a cause of action. Id. One dissenter noted, "This is a purely artificial
cause of action, not founded in reason, not founded in right, but simply a creature of legisla-
tive action; and in my judgment ought to be always subject to the control of the state which
created it." Id. at 65.
37 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 16.
38 3 LINCOLN, supra note 2, at 65. The cause of action for wrongful death is currently
found in N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 (McKinney 2007). The statute provides,
in pertinent part:
(1) The personal representative, duly appointed in this state or any
other jurisdiction, of a decedent who is survived by distributees may
maintain an action to recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect or de-
fault which caused the decedent's death against a person who would
have been liable to the decedent by reason of such wrongful conduct if
11
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B. Judicial Challenges and Interpretation
With the cause of action for wrongful death being protected as
a constitutional guarantee, courts have been left with the task of as-
sessing the implications in matters to be adjudicated. In Medinger v.
Brooklyn Heights Railroad Co., 39 one of the earliest cases following
ratification of the amendment, the appellate court was asked to re-
view a jury verdict of $7,500. The plaintiff-administrator argued the
purpose and intent of the framers of Section 16 supported unlimited
jury determinations based upon the factual considerations of the case,
and may award beyond actual monetary loss. 40  Nevertheless, the
court found the verdict excessive and reduced it.41 The court relied
on statutory interpretations of the wrongful death act prior to the en-
actment of the amendment and held the damages contemplated were
exclusively pecuniary and based its decision on the proceedings of
the Constitutional Convention of 1894.42 The court focused on the
language used during the debates, specifically the following pas-
death had not ensued. Such an action must be commenced within two
years after the decedent's death ....
Limitations on recovery are found in N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3 (McKinney
2007), which provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The damages awarded to the plaintiff may be such sum as the jury
or, where issues of fact are tried without a jury, the court or referee
deems to be fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries result-
ing from the decedent's death to the persons for whose benefit the action
is brought.
9 39 N.Y.S. 613 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1896). The defendant, Brooklyn Heights Railroad
Company, appealed a $7,500 jury verdict in favor of the decedent's estate. The decedent
was killed by the defendant's electric car. She was a sixty-three-year-old woman who did
general housework for her family, which consisted of a husband, who was sixty-five-years-
old, and five grown sons. Medinger, 39 N.Y.S. at 617.








The right of action which now exists is well defined in
the statute. We all know what that is. It has been the
subject of adjudication in this state for the last forty
years. There is no doubt as to the meaning of this lan-
guage, and therefore, by reference to the cause of ac-
tion now existing, and declaring that the right of action
shall further continue, it avoids any circumlocution
which has been suggested by some of the amend-
ments.
The courts, as in all other cases, have the right, and it
is their duty, to set aside verdicts which are excessive
in amount. They are to be just, fair, honest verdicts,
and if they are excessive the courts must exercise their
jurisdiction in this case, as in all others.4
Obviously, the court was intent on preserving the right of ac-
tion which was bolstered by the constitutional guarantee. The court
determined the amendment did not limit the statute's initial purpose
and operation, but required that awards were "measured by the actual
loss sustained. ' ' 45 "It was never the purpose to remove the limitation,
and authorize a recovery of damages, in every case where death was
a result, without regard to the measure of loss, except as it should be,
practically, arbitrarily measured by a jury., 46 The court did concede,
however, "The ingenuity of the human mind has not yet been able to
43 Id. (citing II REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK, MAY 8, 1894, TO SEPTEMBER 29,1894 961 (William H. Steele rev. 1900)).
44 Medinger, 39 N.Y.S. at 617 (citing V REVISED RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, MAY 8, 1894, TO SEPTEMBER 29, 1894 2189-2195
(William H. Steele rev. 1900)).
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compass and formulate a rule by which an exact measurement of
damages may be reached in these cases.,
47
Sharrow v. Inland Lines, Ltd.48 is an example of an expansive
interpretation of this constitutional guarantee. The Court of Appeals
was willing to use Section 16 to save a cause of action, that was
barred by the statute of limitations due to the plaintiffs failure to
prove the action was commenced within two years after the death of
the decedent. The lower courts refused to sustain such an action be-
cause failing to allege so was fatal on demurrer. 49 The Court of Ap-
peals reviewed the history of the wrongful death statute and the pres-
ervation of the right to the action in the constitutional amendment.50
The court focused on the original language governing the time limita-
tion for bringing a wrongful death action, which "provided that every
such action shall be commenced within two years after the death of
such deceased person." 51 However, the statutory language applicable
in this case had omitted the phrase "provided that" and stated simply,
"Such action must be commenced within two years after the dece-
dent's death., 52 The court did not view this omission as unintentional
or ineffectual, and so long as the time limitation remained, it related
to the right rather than the remedy.53 The court reasoned,
The right of action to recover damages for wrongfully
41 Id. at 618.
48 108N.E. 217(N.Y. 1915).
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causing death which has since been made a constitu-
tional right by the action of the people, was thereafter
to be provided for and regulated, not in a separate
statute, but in a general statute designed to be a per-
manent part of our system of jurisprudence. . .. No
good reason existed why the benefit of the general ex-
ceptions given by law to the parties against whom the
bar of the Statute of Limitations is invoked should not
be given to plaintiffs in this class of cases.54
As a result, the court held the language placed a limitation on
the remedy, but did not preclude the right.55 It appears the court ac-
tively seized the judicial opportunity to use the new amendment to
preserve the cause of action on scant, technical grounds.
In In re Meng,56 Section 16 was challenged by the decedent's
grandchildren, who were denied distribution of his estate. They ar-
gued that an amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure (Section
1903, adopted in 1911) allowed for the decedent's spouse alone, in
the absence of children, to receive damages, as opposed to both the
spouse and next of kin.57 The grandchildren also argued that this ab-
rogated the right of action existing on December 31, 1894, and there-
54 Sharrow, 108 N.E. at 218..
55 The court reasoned that
[t]o affirm the judgment under review would be to require that, in every
suit brought to recover damages for negligently or wrongfully causing
death, the complaint must allege that the action had been brought within
two years after the decedent's death. It would plainly be impossible to
comply with this requirement unless the summons was served before the
complaint was prepared; as otherwise it would be impossible to allege
truthfully in the complaint that the action had been commenced.
Id. at 220.
56 125 N.E. 508 (N.Y. 1919).
57 In reMeng, 125 N.E. at 510.
2008]
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fore was unconstitutional.58 The court determined the amendment to
the statute did not abrogate the right of action, because at the time the
constitutional amendment was adopted, the right was vested exclu-
sively in the representative of the decedent. 59 This is distinguishable
from the right to damages which was statutorily vested in the spouse
and next of kin.
60
The court held, "A right of action existing at any time is not
abrogated so long as" the circumstances leading to it remain unal-
tered.61 The court then articulated the facts from which the right of
action arises, which include:
(a) the death of a human being, (b) caused by the
wrongful act, neglect, or default of another, (c) who or
which would have been liable to an action in favor of
the decedent, by reason thereof, if death had not en-
sued, (d) a husband, wife or next of kin of the dece-
dent surviving the decedent and, (e) a personal repre-
sentative of the decedent having been appointed,
constituted a right of action to the personal representa-
tive.
62
The court concluded the 1911 amendments to the wrongful
death statute did not alter the facts from which the right of action had
arisen, and that right of action existing on December 31, 1894 had not
been abrogated or affected.63 The court stated,
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 512.
61 Id. at 510-11.
62 In re Meng, 125 N.E. at511.
63 Id. at 512.
[Vol. 24
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A right of action belongs to or is vested in the person
or persons who has or have the lawful right to prose-
cute it. When a statute creates a liability and pre-
scribes the person who shall have the right to enforce
it, the latter is as component a part of the statutory
right of action as is the former.64
Finally, the court held the rights of the grandchildren were
subject to the force of the 1911 statutory change, precluding them
from a share in the estate's recovery.65
The development of jurisprudence regarding Section 16 con-
tinued when the Meng rationale was upheld in Sutherland v. New
York.66 The Sutherland court stated, a "right of action existing at any
time is not abrogated so long as the facts which give rise to it and
must be proven to maintain it are unchanged., 67  The New York
Court of Claims concluded that its jurisdictional grant, the Court of
Claims Act, did not abrogate the cause of action guaranteed by the
Constitution.68 The Act states, "if a claim which bears interest, is not
filed until more than six months after the accrual of said claim, no in-
terest shall be allowed between the expiration of six months from the
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 68 N.Y.S.2d 553 (N.Y. Ct. CI. 1947).
67 Sutherland, 68 N.Y.S.2d at 571 (citing Meng, 125 N.E. at 510-11).
68 Sutherland, 68 N.Y.S.2d at 572. Since, under the Decedent Estate Law, the action
could only be brought by a duly appointed personal representative of the decedent, the cause
of action for the purposes of the Court of Claims Act accrued when the claimant was ap-
pointed administrator on April 24, 1943. Since no claim had been filed until January 18,
1945, more than six months had expired since the accrual of the claim. Therefore, interest
was to be paid from the date of death until six months after the accrual of the cause of action
and from January 18, 1945, the date when the claim was duly filed to the date of entry of the
judgment. Id. at 570.
2008]
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time of such accrual and the time of the filing of such claim., 69 Al-
though the court cited Meng, it narrowly construed the constitutional
provision, focused on the amount of recovery rather than the right of
action, and reasoned that the provision
has been in the New York State Constitution since the
adoption of the New York State Constitution of 1894,
at which time there was a statutory limitation of
$5,000 upon the amount of recovery in actions of this
kind. It was to prevent the re-enactment of a statute
containing such or similar limitations on the amount
recoverable that this section was then embodied in our
70State Constitution ....
An arguably activist Court of Claims hinted to the possibility
of an alternative interpretation of Section 16 in Horton v. New York.7
The court invoked Section 16 to warrant the payment of $60,000 in
damages for a wrongful death claim resulting from a traffic accident
involving a Volvo automobile and a Trojan tractor shovel owned by
the New York State. The court relied on the constitutional provision
as well as Meng72 and Sutherland.73  Additionally, the court ad-
69 N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 19(1) (McKinney 2007).
70 Sutherland, 68 N.Y.S.2d at 571.
7' 272 N.Y.S.2d 312 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1966). The decedent was a forty-nine year old woman
survived by a fifty-five year old husband, who depended on her for partial support due to his
physical condition, and a seventeen year old daughter. The decedent had been employed as
both a cleaning woman in the school system and school bus driver. The court noted that
[f]or many years, our courts and juries have placed what seems in retro-
spect to be a small or minimum value on the damages sustained to the
next of kin on the death of a wife and mother. It has only been in the last
two decades that our courts have come to recognize the true value of a
housewife and the services she performs.
Horton, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
72 See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
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dressed concerns regarding the right of action being abrogated by leg-
islative enactment, and the possibility of abrogation by judicial fiat.
There is no doubt that this provision was placed in the
Constitution to restrain any action by the Legislature
to abrogate such actions, or to impose a ceiling on the
amount recoverable as was the $5,000 limit under the
former law. Although the judiciary has the power to
modify verdicts in such actions, it would appear rea-
sonable to conclude that this provision might also
cause the judiciary to hesitate taking a course of action
which would reduce or abrogate such a cause of action
and the damages recoverable therein. If the courts are
to take a position that the affluent who have funds to
provide such care can be reimbursed for such dam-
ages, but that those less fortunately situated who have
no funds available are not entitled to the services of a
substitute wife-mother, it would appear that such a
holding would be unconstitutional.74
More recently, the Court of Appeals tolled a statute of limita-
tions where the sole distributee was an infant, and allowed the cause
of action to continue after a complaint had been served subsequent to
the expiration of the one-year-and-ninety-days statute of limitations
had run.
75
The case concerned the confluence of statutes for wrongful
death, estate administration, and disability relating to infancy. 76 Al-
though the personal representative was granted procedural authority
73 See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
74 Horton, 272 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
75 Hernandez v. N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 585 N.E.2d 822 (N.Y. 1991).
76 Id. at 825. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 5-4.1. See also N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC.
ACT §§ 707, 1001 (McKinney 2006); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 208 (McKinney 2003).
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to bring the wrongful death claim, surrogate court procedures made it
impossible for anyone to receive letters of administration until a
guardian was appointed for the infant/sole distributee. 7 The court
determined the tolling provision could be applied when the person
was under a disability. 8 However, since the wrongful death action
accrued upon death, strict adherence to the tolling provision was im-
possible unless the position of the infant was ignored.79
The court refused to reach "that unnecessarily harsh result,
and instead ... construe[d] the toll ... to apply until the earliest mo-
ment there is a personal representative or potential personal represen-
tative who can bring the action, whether by appointment of a guard-
ian or majority of the distributee, whichever occurs first. ' 0 In its
analysis, the court cited Men g81 and Sharrow, and reiterated the two-
year limitation is a limitation on the remedy, not the right.8 2 Fur-
thermore, the court reasoned that while the statute itself placed a time
limit for bringing suit, this should be "treated as an ordinary Statute
of Limitations-subject to any relevant tolling provision-rather than
a condition precedent to suit. '8 3 The court relied on the statutory
scheme for the wrongful death cause of action and cited Section 16.84




81 Id. at 824 (" '[The] right of action belongs to or is vested in the person or persons who
has or have the lawful right to prosecute it.' " (quoting Meng, 125 N.E. at 512)). See also
supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
82 Hernandez, 585 N.E.2d at 824 n.3 (citing Sharrow, 108 N.E. at 218).
83 Hernandez, 585 N.E.2d at 824 n.3 (citing Carrick v. Cent. Gen. Hosp., 414 N.E.2d 632,
638 (N.Y. 1980)).
84 Hernandez, 585 N.E.2d at 825.
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It appears the court was intent on preserving the statutorily-created
and constitutionally-guaranteed right of action for wrongful death,
and finessed the statute of limitations to accomplish its goal.85
These cases are illustrative of the care New York courts have
taken to protect and, if necessary, expand the right to a wrongful
death cause of action. So powerful is this protection that when
choice of law questions have arisen, the Court of Appeals has consis-
tently refused to apply out-of-state wrongful death statutes which
have statutory limitations, noting that such limitations are "absurd
and unjust., 86 Yet the question remains, can such a protection and
the existing jurisprudence construe Rule 2 14-a as an abrogation to the
wrongful death cause of action in the context of misdiagnosis of la-
tent disease?
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-A
The New York State Constitution requires that every twenty
years, and whenever the legislature provides, the people are asked at
a general election, "Shall there be a convention to revise the constitu-
85 See, e.g., id. at 826-27 (Alexander, J., dissenting).
While conceding that E.P.T.L. 5-4.1 vests the right of action for wrong-
ful death exclusively and solely in the personal representative of a dece-
dent's estate, the majority nonetheless concludes that because such an
action is for the benefit of the decedent's distributees, where the sole dis-
tributee is an infant, the saving provision of C.P.L.R. 208 should be ap-
plied to toll the Statute of Limitations. This conclusion has absolutely
no basis in the language of E.P.T.L. 5-4.1 or C.P.L.R. 208 and is incon-
sistent with long standing precedent of this Court.
Id. at 827. Furthermore, the dissent noted that while the Court of Appeals has had the oppor-
tunity to extend the tolling provisions in wrongful death actions in the past, it has declined to
do so. Id.
86 Medinger, 39 N.Y.S. at 616. See also, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 237 N.E.2d 877, 880 (N.Y.
1968); Kilberg v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 528 (N.Y. 1961).
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tion and amend the same?" 87 The constitutional provision barring the
abrogation of a cause of action for wrongful death has not been
changed since its ratification in 1894. Thus enacting the wrongful
death amendment arguably implies that the New York State citizenry
venerates those values. Incorporated into this value system was the
relationship between doctor and patient, which ultimately gave rise to
the medical malpractice cause of action.
Although suits for medical malpractice were rare during the
late 1700s and early 1800s, and determined within the bounds of the
common law of contract, the scope and limits of New York's medical
malpractice jurisprudence shifted to the law of torts.88 Initially, the
American populace was willing to treat medical practice as a purely
commercial enterprise. The courts, as well as the medical profession,
began to incorporate contractual principles into medical liability doc-
trines. During the mid-1800s, however, the relationship between
doctor and patient eroded, along with the medical community's self-
image, thus displacing the contractual basis of the relationship and
relegating medical liability to tort.89
Along with the shift in doctrinal approaches came a mael-
strom of increased medical malpractice litigation, which had its ori-
gins in Western New York. During the 1830s, new Christian sects
emerged that glorified the individual will and expressed an optimistic
87 N.Y. CONST. art. X[X, § 2.
88 KENNETH ALLEN DE VILLE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA
1 (1990). Generally, individuals only sued physicians when severe injury or death occurred.
Id. at 7, 157.
89 Id. See also infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
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belief in human progress without direct divine intervention. It was
believed that humans "could achieve sanctification on earth; they
could become morally perfect .... [And thus,] [m]oral and physical
perfectionism made it much easier and more acceptable to assign
human responsibility to earthly ills." 90 By the 1840s, the entire state
became a "hotbed" for malpractice as the new religious dogma took
hold and combined with the social and political elements of Jackson-
ian democracy. 9' It was estimated that by 1853, nine out of ten phy-
sicians in Western New York had been forced to defend themselves
against medical malpractice charges. 92 "Irregular practitioners were
numerous and popular . . . and they eroded the status and political
power of regular physicians. ' 93
As one commentator noted,
Once instituted, malpractice litigation exposed and ex-
acerbated the fundamental weaknesses of contempo-
rary medical professionalism .... Individual physi-
cians, professional journals, and local medical
societies were faced with dilemmas they could not
solve. No matter how they reacted to the crisis, they
contributed to either public distrust, professional com-
petition, or physicians' incompetence. In turn, this
suspicion, divisiveness, and medical ineptitude aggra-
vated what seemed to be an ever-increasing wave of
malpractice prosecutions.
94
90 DE VILLE, supra note 88, at 126.
9' Id. at 127.
92 Id. at 138.
93 Id.
94 DE VILLE, supra note 88, at 139. However, it was not until 1920 when the legislature
enacted its first malpractice statute which required suits to be brought within two years of
accrual.
The following actions must be commenced within two years after the
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As suits against the medical profession increased, the standard
for medical malpractice, although "simple and well settled,, 95 was
not always easy to apply. This is best exemplified in Pike, where the
Court of Appeals discussed a doctor's duty of care in the majority
opinion.
A physician and surgeon, by taking charge of a case,
impliedly represents that he possesses ... that reason-
able degree of learning and skill that is ordinarily pos-
sessed by physicians and surgeons in the locality
where he practices, and which is ordinarily regarded
by those conversant with the employment as necessary
to qualify him to engage in the business of practicing
medicine and surgery .... The law holds him liable
for an injury to his patient resulting from want of the
requisite knowledge and skill, or the omission to exer-
cise reasonable care, or the failure to use his best judg-
ment .... [It] does not require the surgeon to possess
that extraordinary learning and skill... [but only what
is] possessed by the average member of the medical
profession in good standing .... [T]o render a physi-
cian and surgeon liable, it is not enough that there has
been a less degree of care than some other medical
man might have shown, or less than even he himself
might have bestowed, but there must be a want of or-
dinary and reasonable care, leading to a bad result....
[A] mere error in judgment, provided he does what he
thinks is best after careful examination [is sufficient].
His implied engagement with his patient does not
cause of action has accrued:
1. An action to recover damages for libel, slander, assault, battery, se-
duction, criminal conversation, false imprisonment, malicious prosecu-
tion or malpractice.
N.Y. CIV. PRACTICE ACT § 50 (1920) (emphasis added).
95 Pike v. Honsinger, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (N.Y. 1898).
[Vol. 24
24
Touro Law Review, Vol. 24 [2008], No. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol24/iss2/4
2008] NO ADEQUATE RECOMPENSE
guaranty a good result, but he promises by implication
to use the skill and learning of the average physician,
to exercise reasonable care and to exert his best
judgment in the effort to bring about a good result.
96
Despite the increase of medical malpractice claims, there was
a notable absence of a cause of action specifically for medical mal-
practice.97 However, for cases resulting in death from alleged medi-
cal malpractice, the wrongful death statute was employed. 98 Wrong-
ful death claims of patients were different than other types of
malpractice litigation and often "undermined attempts to sue physi-
cians in fatal cases through the first two-thirds of the century. Con-
sequently, death suits did not play a significant role in the initial in-
crease of suits against physicians, and many of the worst cases of
medical incompetence probably went unpunished." 99 When malprac-
tice suits were successful, especially in cases of gross ineptitude and
96 Id. (emphasis added).
97 See Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years of Harmful Error: The Historical Jurispru-
dence of Medical Malpractice, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1193, 1211 ("[Elarly nineteenth century
law held the physician to the standard that was destined to become the foundation of negli-
gence. The courts of that day did not consider that it should be otherwise, nor was there any
reason they should have."). At the time, the statute of limitations for personal injury result-
ing from negligence was three years. 1848 N.Y. LAWS ch. 379, § 385, amended by 1876
N.Y. LAWS ch. 31, § 385.
98 See, e.g., Harris v. Woman's Hosp., 14 N.Y.S. 881 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1891).
This [was] an action to recover damages for the death of Jennie Harris..
. under [a] statute which gives a right of action for the wrongful act, neg-
ligence, or default causing the death of a person who would have had a
cause of action for such wrongful act, neglect, or default if death had not
ensued.
Id. at 882. Harris was a patient who had submitted to a successful surgical procedure. Id.
Four days later, Harris committed suicide by hurling herself out of a fourth-floor hospital
window. Id. The court affirmed dismissal of the case because there was no negligence on
the part of the surgeons who had performed the operation. Id. at 885.
99 DE VILLE, supra note 88, at 41.
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carelessness, it was often because trial judges and juries incorporating
an outraged sense ofjustice.'00 From a jurisdictional perspective, this
is noteworthy because New York not only had a wrongful death stat-
ute, but it it preserved the right to bring such an action in its constitu-
tion. 101
The doctrinal and historical contexts in which Section 16 was
enacted are compelling. Despite a significant increase in medical
malpractice claims in the state, which had arguably reached crisis
proportions, the wrongful death statute was promulgated and applied
to medical malpractice. More importantly, however, the right of ac-
tion was constitutionally protected, .and early jurisprudence held the
wrongful death cause of action would be abrogated if any facts which
subverted the right to pursue this course were changed. It appears
Rule 214-a, when cast in this historical light, is constitutionally prob-
lematic.
Rule 214-a, enacted in 1986, was an attempt to curtail a per-
ceived medical dilemma: the medical malpractice insurance "cri-
sis.' ' 10 2 The "crisis" has been defined as "a threatened decrease in the
availability of health care services provided by competent, insured
physicians due to the decreased availability of affordable malpractice
00 Id. at 39.
101 Arizona is the only other state that preserves a similar right in its constitution. ARIz.
CONST. art. II, § 31, states: "No law shall be enacted in this State limiting the amount of
damages to be recovered for causing the death or injury of any person."
102 Betsy A. Rosen, Note, The 1985 Medical Malpractice Reform Act: The New York State
Legislature Responds to the Medical Malpractice Crisis with a Prescription for Comprehen-
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insurance."''03 Primary reasons cited for the crisis were the increased
number of suits being filed, the record number of large settlements
and damage awards, and the inefficiency of the existing tort litigation
structure. 10 4 Legislation enacted in the 1970s mitigated the crisis to.
some extent, but failed to remedy the situation completely.10 5 More
stringent measures were demanded, and led to the passage of the
1985 Medical Malpractice Reform Act and Rule 214-a. The statute,
making the cause of action specifically for medical malpractice and
limiting the statute of limitations to two-and-one-half years, was en-
acted to curtail the insurance problem, the effect of which was
claimed to be caused by discovery-based statutes that "forced insur-
ance companies to impose artificially high . . premiums to protect
against increased future damage awards and failed to foreclose the
prosecution of stale or frivolous claims."
' 106
In applying the early rulings of Medinger and Meng to Rule
214-a, a constitutional challenge seems inevitable. Medinger stood
for the proposition that the purpose of the amendment was not to
change or limit the wrongful death cause of action originally created
103 Id. at 137. For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Peter Zablotsky, From A Whim-
per To A Bang: The Trend Toward Finding Occurrence Based Statutes of Limitations Gov-
erning Negligent Misdiagnosis of Diseases With Long Latency Periods Unconstitutional,
103 DICK. L. REV. 455 (1999). See also Thomas A. Moore & Matthew Gaier, The Constitu-
tionality of the Statute of Limitations, 221 N.Y. L.J. 3 (1999).
104 Rosen, supra note 102, at 137-38. There has been considerable debate as to the source
and extent of the medical malpractice insurance crisis. In 1975, at the height of the crisis,
fewer than five claims were filed for every 100 doctors. Mark Monaco, Note, New York's
Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis-A New Direction for Reform, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
773, 773 n.2 (1986).
105 Rosen, supra note 102, at 140. In 1974, the New York Judiciary Law was amended to
require the establishment of medical malpractice panels. See Act of May 30, 1974, ch. 657,
[1974] N.Y. Laws 1010 (McKinney).
106 Zablotsky, supra note 103, at 460-61.
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by statute. In Meng, the court held that abrogation did not occur if
the facts for pursuing and proving the cause of action, which were ar-
ticulated in the statute, remained the same.'0 7
These facts were part of the cause of action ("right of action.
* . now existing") at the time the constitutional provision was rati-
fied,0 8 and one would conclude they were to be subsumed as the
means for the cause of action to proceed.'0 9 Therefore, any change to
these conditions could provoke a constitutional challenge." 0
In a case for wrongful death resulting from the misdiagnosis
of a latent disease, the Meng facts are handily met: death of a human
being; caused by the wrongful act, neglect, or default of another; who
or which would have been liable to an action in favor of the decedent,
by reason thereof, if death had not ensued; a husband, wife or next of
kin of the decedent surviving the decedent; and a personal representa-
tive of the decedent having been appointed-constituted a right of ac-
tion to the personal representative."'
The medical malpractice statute of limitations, which fore-
closes an action from being brought beyond two-and-one-half years,
except in the cases of misplaced foreign objects and continuous treat-
ment, may in the case of latent disease, bar any action before the vic-
tim knows or has reason to know that an injury has occurred."'
Although challenges to Rule 214-a have been brought on
107 Meng, 125 N.E. at 510-11.
108 See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
109 See Sharrow, 108 N.E. at 217; Medinger, 39 N.Y.S. at 615.
10 Meng, 125 N.E. at 510-511.
"' Id. at 511.
112 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214-a (McKinney 2003); Zablotsky, supra note 103, at 477.
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equal protection and due process grounds, there has not yet been a
challenge under the constitutional guarantee of Section 16.113
If such a challenge focuses on the third prong of Meng's facts
("who or which would have been liable to an action in favor of the
decedent, by reason thereof, if death had not ensued"' 14) it would ap-
pear a defendant, by invoking the statutory bar in this context, would
impinge on the constitutional right of the personal representative to
bring a cause of action on behalf of the decedent's survivors. A stat-
ute of limitations is a conditional limitation on the remedy that leaves
the right itself unaffected, and therefore, such a provision impedes the
right of action and seems to go beyond constitutional limits.115
Although it can be argued that the amendment was ratified
during a time when large jury awards, calculation of interest, discount
rates, inflation factors, and spiraling medical and insurance costs
were not considered in today's terms, the Nineteenth Century medical
profession was still confronted with significant challenges in this
area. Jury awards between 1870 and 1900 averaged $2,492.116 Legal
expenses averaged between $800 and $1,000.117 Physicians during
this time were not protected by any form of malpractice insurance.
Malpractice insurance and group defense practices did not originate
until the late 1890s and were not an established feature of medical
practice until the early twentieth century. Prior to this phenomenon,
113 See, e.g., Helgans v. Plurad, 680 N.Y.S.2d 648, 650 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1998).
114 Meng, 125N.E. at511.
1'5 Sharrow, 108 N.E.2d at 220. See also Hernandez, 585 N.E.2d at 824 n.3.
116 Giampino v. Ricci, 609 N.Y.S.2d 134, 137 (Putnam County Sup. Ct. 1994); DE VILLE,
supra note 88, at 190.
... Id. at 204.
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the physicians had to fend and pay for themselves." 8 Physicians' av-
erage annual income during this period ranged between $1,000 and
$1,500. Interestingly, judgments during this period represented a lar-
ger portion of physicians' income than the typical award during the
late Twentieth Century. For example, in 1971, when the average in-
come of physicians was approximately $100,000, fifty-nine percent
of all malpractice awards were less than $3,000.119 Thus, it appears
this argument has little merit when stacked against the theoretical and
historical underpinnings of Section 16.
Today's diagnostic and technological advances arguably
could not have been envisioned by the legal, political, and medical
professionals of the late 1800s, and therefore, the legal basis for
bringing a constitutional challenge to Rule 214-a under Section 16 is
outdated. Although diagnostic tools and procedures would be con-
sidered primitive by today's standards, a New York court in 1889,
reviewing the substantive basis for a medical malpractice suit result-
ing from a misdiagnosis, stated,
the rule is laid down with great distinctness .... To
entitle the plaintiff to recover present damages for ap-
prehended future consequences, there must be such a
degree of probability of their occurring as to amount
to a reasonable certainty that they will result from the
original injury .... In order to entitle the plaintiff to
recover for the permanent injury which it was proven
that he had sustained, it was necessary to prove that
this permanent injury would not have been present had
not the defendant been guilty of negligence or want of
118 Id.
"' Id. at 190.
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skill. 120
In applying this rationale to the context of latent diseases to-
day, with the diagnostic procedures so advanced-enabling the pres-
ervation of the original misdiagnosis-it appears bringing a challenge
under Section 16 is more timely and jurisprudentially appropriate
than it was a hundred years ago.
Many believe the legislature must correct Rule 214-a to elimi-
nate the harshness imposed on those who suffer and ultimately die
because of the misdiagnosis of latent disease. 2 1 However, New York
courts have departed from the status quo; in the area of personal in-
jury, the rules are deemed out of step with the demands and needs of
society. 122  In Bing, the Court of Appeals abandoned the long-
standing precedent that liability of hospitals for injuries suffered by
patients through negligence of its employees was dependent on
120 Smith v. Dumond, 6 N.Y.S. 242, 244 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1st Dep't 1889).
121 Helgans v. Plurad, 680 N.Y.S.2d 648, 650 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1997).
122 See Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). See also Battalla v. New York, 176
N.E.2d 729, 730 (N.Y. 1961) (holding severe emotional and neurological disturbances with
residual physical manifestations states a cause of action).
We act in the finest common-law tradition when we adopt and alter deci-
sional law to produce common-sense justice. Legislative action there
could, of course, be, but we abdicate our own function, in a field pecu-
liarly nonstatutory, when we refuse to reconsider an old and unsatisfac-
tory court-made rule....
It is fundamental to our common-law system that one may seek re-
dress for every substantial wrong.
Id. at 730. (citations and internal quotations omitted). See also People v. Hobson, 348
N.E.2d 894, 901 (N.Y. 1976) ("Tort cases, but especially personal injury cases, offer another
example where courts will, if necessary, more readily re-examine established precedent to
achieve the ends of justice in a more modern context."); Gallagher v. St. Raymond's Roman
Catholic Church, 236 N.E.2d 632, 634 (N.Y. 1968) (holding as invalid a common law rule
which no longer expresses a standard which accords with the mores of society).
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whether the act was "administrative" or "medical," and relied instead
on a theory of respondeat superior.'
23
The rule of nonliability is out of tune with the life
about us, at variance with modem-day needs and with
concepts of justice and fair dealing. It should be dis-
carded. To the suggestion that stare decisis compels
us to perpetuate it until the legislature acts, a ready an-
swer is at hand. It was intended, not to effect a "petri-
fying rigidity," but to assure the justice that flows
from certainty and stability. If, instead, adherence to
precedent offers not justice but unfairness, not cer-
tainty but doubt and confusion, it loses its right to sur-
vive, and no principle constrains us to follow it. 
124
IV. CONCLUSION
As the courts continue to shut down equal protection and due
process challenges to Rule 214-a brought on behalf of victims who
have succumbed to latent diseases due to misdiagnosis by health care
professionals, it appears the stage may be set for an alternative theory
of recovery.
Invoking the constitutional provision that protects the wrong-
ful death cause of action from abrogation by either legislative expedi-
ency or judicial fiat may finally provide these plaintiff-victims with
the justice that has thus far proved elusive. It is hoped that if such a
challenge is brought, the judiciary will abandon the protracted ration-
ale that has subverted the pursuit of a cause of action that, in other
contexts, has been so fiercely protected.
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